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I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs make several arguments urging this Court to answer the Certified 
Questions in the affirmative. Defendant addresses most of them in the Opening Brief of 
Appellant ("Defendant's Brief). In this brief, it provides the following additional 
responses to points raised in Plaintiffs' Brief: 
(a) Plaintiffs' discussion of Utah case law on the public policy cause of 
action, Section 1(A), reinforces the fact that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act 
"UWCA" is a comprehensive scheme that this Court should not effectively change 
through job guarantees and new rights of action. 
(b) Plaintiffs' "doomsday" prediction of what will happen if this Court 
fails to recognize a public policy cause of action consists of sheer speculation; moreover, 
it is undermined by their own statutory analysis which shows that adequate checks on 
Utah employers already exist. 
(c) As set forth in Defendant's Brief and updated in this brief, Plaintiffs' 
state-by-state analysis, Section 1(B), is inaccurate and misleading. 
(d) Plaintiffs' attempt to add an internal opposition cause of action, 
Section 11(A), is not supported by the cases they cite and, as applied to the allegations of 
the Complaint, would go beyond both common and statutory law that have extended 
protections to employees who oppose unlawful treatment of other employees. 
(e) Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Utah common law does not support 
extending the public policy cause of action to claims of constructive discharge; Utah 
should follow jurisdictions that have been unwilling to expand the claim to cases where 
4090/2 00072037 v1 1 
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an employee resigns but alleges he reasonably believed conditions of employment to be 
intolerable. 
(f) Plaintiffs offer no support for their most ambitious application of the 
public policy doctrine to claims of harassment and discrimination short of discharge; to 
Defendant's knowledge, no such support exists and Plaintiffs' position has consistently 
been rejected. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD ANSWER "NO" TO THE FIRST CERTIFIED 
QUESTION 
A. Plaintiffs' Arguments Regarding The Importance And 
Comprehensiveness Of The UWCA Do Not Support Recognizing A 
Common Law Wrongful Discharge Cause Of Action 
Plaintiffs emphasize the importance and comprehensiveness of the 
UWCA's statutory scheme. They quote and emphasize this Court's description of the 
Act as "a comprehensive scheme enacted to provide speedy compensation to workers 
who are injured as a result of an accident occurring in the course and scope of their 
employment." Sheppickv. Albertson's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1996) (quoted at 
p.5 of Plaintiffs' Brief). Plaintiffs go on to note the UWCA's exclusive remedy 
provision, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-2-105(1), which makes the right to recover 
compensation for injuries the "exclusive remedy against the employer," which "shall be 
in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common law and otherwise, to 
the employee." Plaintiffs' Brief, p.5. 
Plaintiffs fail to explain why if the Legislature created an "exclusive and 
comprehensive" statutory scheme, and expressly limited employee rights of recovery 
4090/2 00072037 v1 2 
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against employers, that an additional cause of action is necessary to preserve the "entire 
purpose" of this "whole regulatory scheme." Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6. 1 he\ oliei no 
rational loi win LIIK> Loan a^  .;-pjx-Lu ;. i .. c .v;U: decide TUh 
comprehensive afia 11 if a nevs provision ^ " T U I. tonus oi u . ^ l ^ e r 
behavior and giving employees a right of action needs to be added when it has long been 
understood that the UWCA guarantees a re rom an employer for an on-the job 
injury regardless of fault, but not continued employment. "While it may be generous and 
considerate of the employer to reemploy a man who has been injured, the law does not 
impose any such legal duty." Wilsteadv. Industrial Commission of Utah, 17 Utah 2d 
214; 40 1 i .2d 692 , 694 I ; 965 ("To accept the proposition plaintiff contends for w o u l d 
e:s :tei i I tl I = • "i  /" / : i kn i "ti i's C : I np ' : i IM Xi ;: i i /: ,::t 1 ;; - r , 1 ii j: i iq >osi : it i, i n!;iKv .= :i, , : a 11 
unemployment compensat ion act also"). 
Plaintiffs conju scenar io in w m ^ ,
 LA1^  ' who le regulator) 
s c h e m e " and u eutiij puq d if employees ;ann« rs foi 
i ' : ti die Ji i : n , an :1 th :  i ti. ,. : ft i l it ^  = 1 c : i \ • : : i • i th = ' nnt si i :h • : • : i \ is = : f i , : t l : i l f :: i il :! 1 : < : jc I Jt<; J i 
workers "in a worse posit ion than they were prior to the enactment o f the U W e A. 
Plaintiffs' Brief, p . 6 7. This gi ini, but . • illy speci i l a l i !i i ^ni,1',:^:1;! , adon is not borne 
in by the continued legislative si lence v i en die Legislature could easi ly remedy such a 
problem if it really existed. The right to terminate an at-will e m p l o y e e w h o sustains a 
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work-related injury has remained the same before and after the enactment of the UWCA; 
employees are no better or worse off in this respect.1 
Plaintiffs cite various criminal penalties to which employers are subject if 
they evade their UWCA obligations, Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6, n. 4. These provisions, along 
with some others within and without the UWCA help explain the baselessness of 
Plaintiffs' fear that the Act will be destroyed without an anti-retaliation cause of action. 
As the provisions they cite demonstrate, there are real legal sanctions for employers that 
do not take their UWCA obligations seriously. See UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-407 
(employers must promptly report all work-related injuries to the Division of Industrial 
Actions); §34A-2-405 (injured workers must be compensated whether or not they 
continue to be employed); §34A-2-301 (an employer may not "maintain any place of 
employment that is not safe"). Plaintiffs note that Defendant is self-funded, as allowed 
by UTAH CODE ANN. §34A-2-201.5. Plaintiffs' Brief, p. xvi. However, as can be seen 
in that detailed statutory section, self-insurers come under especially close regulatory 
1
 Plaintiffs' worse-than-before-UWCA argument fails to take into account 
that prior to the UWCA, employees had to overcome almost insurmountable obstacles 
before they could obtain any remedy from an employer for an on-the-job injury. They 
not only had to prove that the employer was negligent but had to overcome the "unholy 
trinity" of common law defenses: fellow servant rule, assumption of the risk, and 
contributory negligence. See Lukic v. Southern Pacific Co., 160 F. 135 (1908) (directing 
verdict for employer because the railroad laborer's injury was caused by the negligence 
of a fellow servant brakeman). 
Af\Qf\n (\r\r\n~ic\in «. i A 
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scrutiny and face costly consequences if regulators believe they are not properly 
discharging their UWCA obligations. 
Plaintiffs' notion that absent a common law anti-retaliation cause of action, 
employers have an "unfettered" right to terminate injured workers also overlooks 
available federal remedies. Employers of fifty or more employees, such as Defendant, 
who allegedly make it a practice of firing injured workers would be subject to the 
remedies and relief provided by the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., 
which guarantees qualified employees up to a twelve-week leave of absence while being 
kept on the employer's health care plan. Under the Americans With Disabilities Act 
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C § 12131 et seq., workers whose injuries constitute an impairment 
"that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" would be entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation allowing them to continue in their present job or, if this is not 
possible, transfer to a vacant job they can perform with or without a reasonable 
accommodation. An employer's failure to follow its ADA obligations, or any retaliation 
against an employee with a disability, would subject it to statutory remedies including 
reinstatement, back pay, attorneys1 fees and compensatory and punitive damages. 42 
USCS § 12205 (providing for attorney fees); 42 USCS § 12117(a) (2005) (incorporating 
Title VII remedies); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (providing for compensatory and punitive 
damages); 42 U.S.C. § 2000E-5(G) (providing for various remedies, including 
reinstatement and backpay). Indeed, all of the named Plaintiffs have filed administrative 
claims against Defendant with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
("EEOC") and the Antidiscrimination and Labor Division of the Labor Commission of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Utah. One Plaintiff, Felix Barela, filed a lawsuit under the ADA against Defendant in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Barela v. La-Z-Boy Corporation, Case 
No. 1:03CV0032. 
The sense of urgency Plaintiffs attempt to generate simply does not exist. 
If the purposes of the UWCA might be enhanced or better effectuated with some form of 
anti-retaliation cause of action, the Legislature can spend the time and give the requisite 
attention to whether this is so and what the parameters of such action might be in order to 
balance properly the following "competing legitimate interests:" "The interests of the 
employer to regulate the environment to promote productivity, security, and similar 
lawful business objectives, and the interests of the employees to maximize access to their 
statutory and Constitutional rights within the workplace." Hansen v. America Online, 
Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004). 
B. Plaintiffs' Multi-State Analysis Is Flawed 
Both parties have analyzed cases and legislation from other jurisdictions in 
an attempt to persuade the Court to accept their positions.2 Plaintiffs' analysis, however, 
2
 Defendant has made three corrections to its own multi-state analysis that 
affect Exhibit B (which catalogues the states in which courts did not create a cause of 
action in the absence of an anti-retaliation or interference statute) and Exhibit C (which 
catalogues the states in which courts created a cause of action based on the general 
policies in the workers' compensation statute). 
The state of Delaware has moved from Exhibit B, Category (1), to 
Exhibit B, Category (2), because the Delaware legislature did enact an anti-retaliation 
statute in 1997, 19 Del. C. § 2365, after the court in Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 
1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (Del. 1985) had refused to create such a cause of action in 
[Footnote continued on next page] 
4090/2 00072037 v1 6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is flawed. The critical question is not how many states have created a wrongful discharge 
cause of action based on the exercise of workers' compensation rights, but how they did 
it. Of the 43 states that did create such a cause of action, 32 have relied on their 
legislatures to provide a specific basis for the cause of action, rather than have their 
courts create it based on the general policies in their workers' compensation statutes. 
While some of those legislatures enacted more specific statutes than others, all of them 
[Continued from previous page] 
the absence of such a statute. See Amended Exhibit B, attached to the Addendum of this 
Reply Memorandum. 
The state of Arkansas has moved from Exhibit C to Exhibit B, because the 
court in Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) recognized 
the existence of a retaliatory discharge cause of action based on a statute in the Workers' 
Compensation Act that provided a criminal penalty for any employer who "willfully 
discriminates" against "any individual on account of his claiming benefits. Although the 
Arkansas legislature later chastised the court for usurping its function by expanding the 
penalty for a violation to include civil remedies, Tackett v. Crain Automotive d/h/a Car 
Pro, 321 Ark. 36; 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995), that makes the contrast with Utah even more 
compelling. Unlike Utah there is no statute whatsoever that prohibits an employer from 
terminating the employment of an employee who has filed a workers' compensation 
claim. 
The state of Kentucky has moved from Exhibit B to Exhibit C, because the 
court in Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky 1983), had created a 
wrongful discharge cause of action despite the absence of any provisions specifically 
restricting an employer from discharging an employee for the exercise of rights under the 
workers' compensation statutes. But see id. at 733 ("The statement that the Workers' 
Compensation Act was violated is pure sophistry The majority opinion is not 
based on reason, it is simply an expression of distaste for discharge of an employee for 
filing a claim of workers' compensation . . . . Violation of a right 'implicit' in a statute is 
so vague as to cover about any situation the majority determines in its wisdom is contrary 
to standards of justice.") (J. Stephenson, dissenting). Later, in 1987, the Kentucky 
legislature enacted KRS § 342.197, which prohibits discrimination against any employee 
who has filed and pursues a lawful workers' compensation claim. See Amended Exhibits 
B and C, attached to the Addendum of this Reply Memorandum. 
4090/2 00072037 v 1 7 
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gave their courts an express statutory hook on which to hang a wrongful discharge cause 
of action. The Utah legislature has not. 
Although Plaintiffs assert that there are 25 states in which courts have 
recognized such a wrongful discharge cause of action, even without a specific statutory 
prohibition, that statement is incorrect. Only 11 states have done so (Amended 
Exhibit C). Plaintiffs have simply misclassified numerous cases. For example, in 
Sorenson v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70 (Id. 1990), there was no workers' compensation 
retaliation claim at issue. On the contrary, the issue was whether the court should apply 
the public policy exception to the at-will rule in situations where an employee is 
terminated for his religious beliefs or his efforts to negotiate employment conditions in 
good faith. The court decided "no." In Judson v. Workers' Compensation Appeals 
Board, 586 P.2d 564 (Cal. 1978), the court was enforcing CAL. LABOR CODE§ 132a 
(prohibiting workers' compensation retaliation), which the California legislature had 
enacted in 1972. In Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1990), 
the court was enforcing the same statutory "other device" language that formed the basis 
for the wrongful discharge cause of action in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 
Ind. 249, 297 N.E. 2d 425 (1973). The list goes on. Cf. Plaintiffs Brief, Section B, and 
Defendant's Amended Exhibits B and C, attached to the Addendum of this Reply 
Memorandum. 
The fact that Plaintiffs have misclassified so many states that have relied on 
their legislatures to create a statutory basis for the cause of action underscores the 
weakness of their claim in Utah, which lacks any such statutory basis. It is also 
4090/2 00072037 v 1 8 
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significant that out of the 11 states in which courts have created such a tort based on the 
"general policies" existing in the penumbras of the workers' compensation statute, rather 
than on a specific statutory provision, legislatures in five of those states later intervened 
to enact legislation (Arizona, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, and North Dakota). At 
least one legislature "took express exception to the court's indication that it rather than 
the legislature had the authority to define public policy." Galati v. America West 
Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69 P.3d 1011 (2003). Another legislature made it clear that 
its "avowed purpose was to overrule our decisions" where the courts created retaliatory 
discharge tort based on a criminal statute. Tackett v. Grain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro, 
321 Ark. 36, 38; 899 S.W.2d 839, 840 (1995). 
In most states, courts and legislatures alike have recognized, sometimes 
explicitly, that it is not appropriate for courts to attempt to correct perceived legislative 
omissions by creating causes of action based on the "general policies" of their workers' 
compensation law, despite the absence of any specific statutory basis for it. The same 
fundamental principles that animated those decisions apply in Utah. As Utah's State 
Constitution makes clear, it is not the function of courts to correct perceived defects and 
omissions in legislation, or to "protect" perceived policies in legislative enactments by 
usurping the legislative function. Article V, Section 1 states: "The powers of the 
government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of 
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
4090/2 00072037 v1 9 
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permitted." Article VIII, Section 22 provides that if the Supreme Court discerns "any 
seeming defect or omission in the law," it shall report it in writing to the Governor. Thus, 
even if this Court considered the 88-year absence of such a cause of action to be a 
legislative omission or policy oversight, it would not be the function of the Court to 
create a cause of action, but at most to advise the Governor or the Legislature of any 
concerns. The Court should follow those states that have relied on their legislatures to 
provide a specific statutory basis for a workers' compensation retaliation claim before 
recognizing such a cause of action. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD ANSWER "NO" TO THE SUBPARTS OF THE 
SECOND CERTIFIED QUESTION 
If the Court answers the First Certified Question in the negative, as it 
should, the Court need not address the three subparts of the Second Certified Question. 
Indeed, the need to address such detailed, policy-making subparts underscores why the 
Court should answer "no" to the First Certified Question. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
the Court sees fit to explore the various potential parameters of a retaliation claim, it 
should answer the subparts of the Second Certified Question in the negative. 
A. There Is No Basis To Add An Internal Opposition Claim To The 
Retaliatory Discharge Tort 
In Plaintiffs' Brief, they make no attempt to fit the allegations of their 
Complaint regarding Ms. Touchard to any of the four categories of public policy 
wrongful discharge listed by this Court in Hansen, at 952. Moreover, they make no 
attempt to fit the allegations of the Complaint to the framework of Utah public policy 
case law developed over the past decade and a half. They cite no Utah cases, and the 
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cases cited from other jurisdictions do not help them since they all involve statutory 
construction or interpretation as opposed to judge-made common law exceptions to 
at-will employment. See Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 
1504-05 (2005) (retaliation for internal complaint of sex discrimination included within 
"broad" statutory provision of Title IX prohibiting "discrimination" on the basis of sex). 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236-37 (1969) (both white lessor and 
African-American lessee protected by 42 U.S.C. §1982, which grants parties, regardless 
of race, the right to lease real and personal property). Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 
859 F.2d 1439, 1446-47 (10th Cir. 1988) (white manager who was fired after refusing to 
discharge an African-American employee and after he stated his intention to support the 
employee's EEOC claim protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which preserves the rights of 
parties to make and enforce contracts without regard to race); Wilkerson v. Standard 
Knitting Mills, Inc., 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 666, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 56,274 (1989) 
(employer's order to company nurse to help evade its statutory obligations constituted a 
"device" under the Tennessee Workers Compensation Statute, TCA § 50-6-114, which 
prohibits any "device" which might operate to relieve employers of their obligations 
"created by this chapter"). 
Contrast these statutory interpretation cases with the common law cases 
cited in Defendant's Brief pp. 32-33, and with another case refusing to extend the 
common law cause of action to non-injured employees who assist others in filing for 
workers' compensation: Taylor v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 29533 
(9 Cir. 1998) (although Nevada has adopted the public policy wrongful discharge claim 
AOQOP 00072037 v 1 1 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for employees fired in retaliation for seeking worker's compensation benefits, it would 
not extend it "to protect personnel employees whose duty it is to assist co-workers in 
processing [worker's compensation] claims," and noting that Nevada courts have 
required more than a "mere objection" to employer policies but an actual "refusal to 
comply with an employer's demand" that the employee engage in improper or unlawful 
behavior.) 
In Plaintiffs' Brief, they note that Ms. Touchard worked as "the 
Environmental/Assistant Safety Manager," that "[o]ne of Ms. Touchard's 
responsibilities" related to investigating Defendant's workers' compensation costs, which 
led her to write the memorandum she attaches to the Complaint, and that "[a]s part of her 
job duties," she led an ergonomics team, which led her to criticize some of the company's 
safety policies and practices. Plaintiffs' Brief, p. xxxiii. They assert that despite her 
efforts to "compel" or "push" her employer to follow her recommendations, it would not 
do so and instead turned on her. Plaintiffs' Brief, pp. 14-15. 
Extending the public policy cause of action to these circumstances would 
go beyond even what courts have allowed when applying statutes that expressly create 
anti-retaliation causes of action. In McKenzie v. Renberg's, Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10 Cir. 
1996), a personnel director, whose responsibilities included monitoring compliance with 
wage and hour laws, complained to the company attorney and president that a problem 
existed with complying with the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). The employer fired 
her shortly thereafter. Despite the fact that the FLSA has an express cause of action 
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based on employer retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), the court dismissed her complaint 
because she never stepped outside of her role as personnel director: 
"Here, McKenzie never crossed the line from being an employee merely 
performing her job as Personnel Director to an employee lodging a personal 
complaint against the wage and hour practices of her employer and 
asserting a right adverse to the company. McKenzie did not initiate a 
FLSA claim against the company on her own behalf or on behalf of anyone 
else. Rather, in her capacity as personnel manager, she informed the 
company that it was at risk of claims that might be instituted by others as a 
result of its alleged FLSA violations. In order to engage in protected 
activity under Section 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her 
role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to file) an 
action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting 
FLSA rights, or otherwise engage in activities that reasonably could be 
perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the FLSA. 
Here, McKenzie did none of these things.... McKenzie's actions in 
connection with the overtime pay issue were completely consistent with her 
duties as Personnel Director for the company." Id. at 1486-1487. 
Other courts have reached the same conclusion: e.g., Claudio-Gotay v. 
Becton Dickinson Caribe, LTD., 375 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2004) ("when [plaintiff] first 
informed Becton of the potential overtime violations, he did so in furtherance of his job 
responsibilities"); Robinson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 341 F. Supp, 2d 759, 763 (W.D. MI 
2004) ("Plaintiffs' expressions of concern, even if characterized as 'complaints,' were 
made in her capacity as Personnel Training Coordinator"); Smith v. Language Analysis 
Systems, Inc., 41 Va. Cir. 375, 378 (1997) ("nothing [plaintiff] did extended beyond the 
scope of her position as Director of Human Resources.") Cf. EEOC v. HBE Corp., 153 F. 
3d 543 554 (8 Cir. 1998) (approving the principle enunciated in McKenzie but 
distinguishing the case based on the fact that plaintiff "refused to implement a 
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discriminatory company policy" by firing an African-American; this refusal "placed him 
outside the normal managerial role.") 
B. Constructive Discharge Would Unduly Expand The Scope Of The 
Public Policy Cause Of Action 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion in their brief, p. 18, this Court has neither 
explicitly nor implicitly recognized that constructive discharge is legally equivalent to an 
actual discharge. The parties could possibly have raised the issue in Bihlmaier v. Carson, 
603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979), or Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P. 2d 828 (Utah 1992). 
However, they did not. 
Defendant acknowledges that courts in Washington and Nevada have 
extended the public policy cause of action to claims of constructive discharge. However, 
it believes the more conservative approach enunciated by courts in Illinois and discussed 
in Defendants9 Brief, p. 33-34, would be more consistent with this Court's approach to 
applying and potentially expanding the public policy cause of action. 
In addition, Defendant believes that if this Court were to extend the cause 
of action to claims of constructive discharge, in keeping with its conservative approach, it 
should not adopt the more expansive definition enunciated in Pennsylvania State Police 
v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004), as Plaintiffs suggest. Suders construed Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and was not addressing the more nuanced question of making 
judicial exceptions to at-will employment. The standard adopted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court: "Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?" Id. at 141, subjects employers 
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and the courts to myriad cases in which an employee quits but then asks a judge or jury to 
agree that his resignation was "reasonable" in light of how bad working conditions were. 
This open-ended standard could upset the balance of employer-employee interests this 
Court noted in Hansen, 96 P. 3d at 953. 
Instead, the standard should be as described by Justice Thomas in his 
dissent in Suders, which tracked jurisprudence under the National Labor Relations Act 
and early cases under Title VII. Under this standard of constructive discharge, an 
employee would be required to show that the employer specifically intended to make him 
or her quit by deliberately rendering their working conditions intolerable, and thus 
effectively acting with the same purpose and effect as an actual discharge. 542 U.S. at 
152-154. See also Korslundv. Duincorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc., 121 Wn. App. 295, 
88 P.3d 966 (Wash. App. 2004), cited by Plaintiffs, which allows the constructive 
discharge claim, but requires "a plaintiff to prove that an employer deliberately rendered 
working conditions intolerable and thus forced the employee to permanently 'leave' the 
employment." 88 P.3d at 976. 
C. Plaintiffs Provide No Basis To Extend The Cause Of Action Beyond 
Discharge 
Plaintiffs cite no authority extending the public policy cause of action 
beyond discharge, whether constructive or actual, and Defendant is aware of none. 
Rather, to Defendant's knowledge, when faced with the question, no court has been 
willing to extend the common law at-will exception to demotions, transfers, wage 
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reductions, mean-spiritedness, or any other allegedly retaliatory actions that stop short of 
discharge.3 
Plaintiffs make an impassioned policy argument for such an extension at 
pages 20-21 of their brief. Defendant does not share their speculative assumptions; nor 
does it agree with the "logic" of morphing the constructive discharge standard into a 
standard applicable to employees who remain employed (which might be characterized as 
an "intolerable - but tolerated" standard). In any event, if there is any merit to such an 
argument, it ought to be directed to the Utah Legislature which can weigh the multitude 
of potential variations of such a claim while seeking to preserve the balance described in 
Hansen. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, La-Z-Boy respectfully requests that this Court 
answer "no" to the certified questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Utah. The Court should rely on the Legislature to define the public policy of the State, 
and to determine what causes of action and remedies, if any, are needed to protect the 
rights and policies in the Workers' Compensation Act. The Legislature has amended the 
Act numerous times in its 88-year history when it discerned a need to do so. It has 
fulfilled its constitutionally delegated function. The continued legislative silence 
3
 Defendant notes that even the Washington case cited by Plaintiffs joins 
others in rejecting the cause of action sought by Plaintiffs in this last Certified Question: 
"This tort applies only when an employee has been discharged." Korslund, 88 P.3d at 
975. 
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regarding an anti-retaliation cause of action should not be disturbed by this Court. The 
decision of whether, when, under what circumstances and with what remedies such a 
cause should be created should be left to that elected body. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j?fi(iay of January, 2006. 
BULLARD SMITH JERNSTEDT WILSON 
By 
Jathan Janove, USB No. 3722 
Attorneys for Appellant 
La-Z-Boy Incorporated 
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AMENDED EXHIBIT B 
IN 36 STATES, COURTS DID NOT CREATE A CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE 
ABSENCE OF AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
1. IN 4 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONTINUED 
NOT TO ENACT AN ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE 
STATUTE 
Georgia Evans v. Bibb Company, 178 Ga. App. 139; 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986) 
("Courts may interpret laws, but may not change them"). 
Mississippi J.C Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Company, 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 
1981) ("[t]he merits of his arguments are clearly for the Legislature to 
assess, not the judiciary. Our Workmen's Compensation Law does not 
contain a provision making it a crime for an employer to discharge an 
employee for filing a claim"). 
Rhode Pacheco v. Raytheon Company, 623 A.2d 464 (R.I. 1993) ("It is not the 
Island role of the courts to create rights for persons whom the Legislature has not 
chosen to protect"). 
Wisconsin Brown v. Pick'N Save Food Stores, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (Wis. 2001) 
("[T]he Wisconsin legislature created forfeiture as the only remedy in this 
situation, and in 1975 it created a cause of action for a related kind of 
discrimination but not for this kind of discrimination"). 
2. IN 7 STATES, COURTS EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO CREATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION, BUT THE LEGISLATURE HAS SINCE 
CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BY ENACTING AN ANTI-
RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
Alabama Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814, 815 (Ala. 1984) 
("Why then should we not leave it to the legislature to change the rule in 
this case, where the employee was discharged allegedly for seeking 
workmen's compensation benefits, a legislatively created right?"), 
superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (prohibiting termination, 
as recognized in Twilley v. Dauber & Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So. 2d 
1364 (Ala. 1988). 
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Delaware Emory v. Nanticoke Homes, Inc., 1985 Del. Super. LEXIS 1063 (Del. 
1985) ("In Delaware, it is for the General Assembly, not the judiciary, 
to declare the public policy of the state") superseded by statute, DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 2365 (prohibiting discharge, retaliation or 
discrimination). 
Florida Segal v. Arrow Industries Corporation, 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1978) 
("There is no statute for retaliatory discharge. The court declines to 
follow the reasoning of cases such as Frampton, superseded by FLA. 
STAT. § 440.205 (prohibiting discharge, threatening discharge, 
intimidation or coercion). 
Missouri Christy v. Paul Petrus, d/b/a South Side Auto Parts, 365 Mo. 1187; 295 
S.W.2d 122 (1956) ("We can hardly conceive of the legislature making 
such careful provision for the rights and compensation of injured 
employees covered by the Act and yet omitting a specific provision for 
recovery of damages for wrongful discharge if there had been any intent 
to create such a right") superseded by statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.780 
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any way) as recognized in 
Kratzer v. Polar Custom Trailers, Inc., et al, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16981 (Mo. 2003). 
New York N. Y. WORKERS3 COMP. LAW § 120 (prohibiting discharge or 
discrimination in any manner), as recognized in {Axel v. Duffy-Mott 
Company Inc., Al N.Y.2d 1; 389 N.E.2d 1075 (1979) ("This relatively 
recently enacted statute forbids employers to discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against employees who claim compensation for job-related 
injuries or who testify in proceedings to enforce such payment"); cf. 
Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d 293; 448 
N.E.2d 86 (1983) ("This court has not and does not now recognize a 
cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful discharge of an 
employee; such recognition must await action of the Legislature"). 
North Carolina Dockery v. Lampart Table Company and U.S. Furniture Industries, 36 
N.C. App. 293; 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978) ("If the General Assembly of 
North Carolina had intended a cause of action be created, surely, in a 
workmen's compensation statute as comprehensive as ours, it would 
have specifically addressed the problem."), superseded by statute, N.C 
GEN. STAT § 95-241 (prohibiting discrimination or retaliatory action), as 
recognized in Abels v. Renfro Corporation, 335 N.C. 209; 436 S.E.2d 
822(1993). 
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South Carolina Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536; 59 S.E.2d 148 
(1950) (dismissing complaint because a retaliatory discharge for filing a 
worker's compensation claim fails to state a claim), superseded by 
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. §41-1-80, as recognized in Hinton v. Designer 
Ensembles, Inc., 343 S.C. 236; 540 S.E.2d 94 (2000) (prohibiting 
discharge or demotion). 
3. IN 25 STATES, LEGISLATURES FILLED SILENCE BY 
ENACTING ANTI-RETALIATION OR INTERFERENCE 
STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL RULE 
Alaska Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427 (Alas. 2004) (allowing a 
cause of action based on ALASKA STAT. § 23.30-247, which prohibits 
discrimination in hiring, "promotion, or retention policies or practices"). 
Arkansas Wal-Mart v. Pam Baysinger, 306 Ark. 239; 812 S.W.2d 463 (1991) 
(recognizing cause of action based on a criminal statute that expressly 
prohibited any employer from willfully discriminating against "any 
individual on account of his claiming benefits"), amended and 
superseded by ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107 (prohibits discrimination in 
regard to hiring or employment and provides penalties as determined by 
the Workers' Compensation Commission; specifically annulling Wal-
Mart) as recognized by Tackett v. Crain Automotive d/b/a Car Pro, 321 
Ark. 36; 899 S.W.2d 839 (1995) ("There is no doubt that the 
legislature's intent in the passage of Act 796 of 1993 [amending Ark. 
Code Ann. § 11-9-107] in fact its avowed purpose was to overrule our 
decisions [in three cases, including Wal-Mart], where we" created 
retaliatory discharge tort based on the criminal statute) (J. Corbin 
dissenting opinion). 
California Portillo v. G. T. Price Productions, Inc., etal, 131 Cal. App. 3d 285; 
182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (allowing a cause of action based on CAL. 
LABOR CODE§ 132a, which prohibits discharge, threatening to discharge 
or discrimination in any manner). 
Connecticut Baldracchiv. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Division, United Technologies 
Corporation, 814 F.2d 102 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-290a, which prohibits discharge or 
discriminating in any manner). 
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Hawaii 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Louisiana 
Maine 
Maryland 
Massachusetts 
Minnesota 
Takakiv. Allied Machinery Corporation, etaL, 87 Haw. 57; 951 P.2d 
507 (1998) (allowing a cause of action based on HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-
32 which prohibits discharge and discrimination based "solely" the 
employee suffering a work injury). 
Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Company, 260 Ind. 249; 297 N.E.2d 
425 (1973) ("We believe the threat of discharge to be a 'device5 within 
the framework of 22-3-2-15") (allowing a cause of action based on IND. 
CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-15, which provides that "No contract or agreement, 
written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in any 
manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any 
obligation created by this act"). 
Springer v. Weeks and Leo Company, Inc., 429 N.W.2d 558 (1988) 
(allowing a cause of action based on low A CODE§ 85.18, which 
provides that "No contract, rule, or device whatsoever shall operate to 
relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by 
this chapter except as herein provided"). 
Robin v. Raoul i(Skip " Galan, Clerk of the Court of Jefferson Parish, 
545 So. 2d 1129 (La. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361, which prohibits discharge and refusal to 
hire). 
ME. REV. STAT ANN tit 39-A § 353 (prohibits discrimination in any 
manner). 
Ewingv. Koppers Company, Inc., 312 Md. 45; 537 A.2d 1173 (1988) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 
9-1105, which prohibits discharge, based "solely" on employee filing a 
claim). 
Ourfalian v. Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc., 31 Mass. App. Ct. 294; 
577 N.E.2d 6 (1991) (allowing a cause of action based on MASS. ANN 
LAWS. CH. 152 § 75B, which prohibits discharge, discrimination in any 
manner or refusal to hire). 
Wojciakv. Northern Package Corporation, 310 N.W.2d 675 (1981) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MINN. STAT § 176.82, which 
prohibits discharge or threatening to discharge). 
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Montana 
New Jersey 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
South Dakota 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Lueckv. United Parcel Service, 258 Mont. 2; 851 P.2d 1041 (1993) 
(allowing a cause of action based on MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-317, 
which prohibits termination). 
Laity v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668; 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (allowing a 
cause of action based on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-39.1, which prohibits 
retaliation). 
Wilson v. Riverside Hospital, 18 Ohio St. 3d 8; 479 N.E.2d 275 (1985) 
(allowing a cause of action based on OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.90, 
which prohibits discharge, demotion, reassignment or any punitive 
action). 
Bishop v. Hale-Halsell Company Inc., 1990 OK 95; 800 P.2d 232 
(1990) (allowing a cause of action based on OKLA. STAT. tit. 85 § 5, 
which prohibits discharge). 
Brown v. Transcon Lines et al, 284 Ore. 597; 588 P.2d 1087 (1978) 
(allowing a cause of action based on OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.043, which 
prohibits discharge, discrimination or refusal to hire). 
Niesent v. Homestake Mining Company of California, 505 N.W.2d 781 
(S.D. 1993) (allowing a cause of action based on S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
62-3-18, which provides that "No contract or agreement, express or 
implied, no rule, regulation, or other device, shall in any manner operate 
to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by 
this title except as herein provided"). 
Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Company, 677 S.W.2d 441 (1984) ("In this 
regard, we agree with Frampton that a retaliatory discharge constitutes a 
device under § 50-6-114) (allowing a cause of action based on TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-6-114, which provides that "No contract or agreement, 
written or implied or rule, regulation or other device, shall in any 
manner operate to relieve any employer, in whole or in part, of any 
obligation"). 
Texas Steel Company v. Edward Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (1976) 
(allowing a cause of action based on TEX. LAB. CODE § 451.001, which 
prohibits discharge or discrimination in any manner). 
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Vermont Murray v. Si Michael's College and Donald Sutton, 164 Vt. 205; 667 
A.2d 294 (1995) (allowing a cause of action based on VT. ST AT. ANN. tit. 
21 § 710, which prohibits discharge or discrimination). 
Virginia Cooley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 257 Va. 518; 514 S.E.2d 770 (1999) 
(allowing a cause of action based on VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-308, which 
prohibits discharge). 
Washington Lins v. Children's Discovery Centers of American, Inc., 95 Wn. App. 
486; 972 P.2d 168 (1999) (allowing a cause of action based on WASH. 
REV. CODE § 51.48.025, which prohibits discharge or discrimination in 
any manner). 
West Virginia Skaggs v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 212 W. VA. 248; 569 S.E.2d 
769 (2002) (allowing a cause of action based on W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-
5A-1, which prohibits discrimination in any manner). 
Wyoming Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, 776 P.2d 
752 (Wyo. 1989) (allowing a cause of action based on WYO. STAT ANN. 
§ 27-14-104(b), which provides that "No contract, rule, regulation or 
device shall operate to relieve an employer from any liability created by 
this act except as otherwise provided by this act"). 
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AMENDED EXHIBIT C 
IN 11 STATES, COURTS CREATED A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE 
GENERAL POLICIES IN THE WORKERS9 COMPENSATION STATUTE, 
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A SPECIFIC ANTI-RETALIATION OR 
INTERFERENCE STATUTE 
Arizona Although the Arizona Supreme Court indicated in Wagenseller v. 
Scottsdale Memorial Hospital et al, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) 
(that an at-will employee could bring a wrongful termination in violation 
of public policy and that the court itself could determine the public policy 
from common law, the Arizona legislature rebuked the court for usurping 
its function by enacting ARIZ. REV STAT. § 23-1501 (prohibits retaliatory 
termination and provides the right to bring a tort claim for wrongful 
termination); Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290; 69 
P.3d 1011 (2003) ("The legislature in enacting A.R.S. § 23-1501 took 
express exception to the court's indication that it rather than the 
legislature had the authority to define public policy"). 
Colorado Lathrop v. Entenmann 's Inc., 770 P.2d 1367; 1989 Colo. App. LEXIS 26 
(1989). 
Illinois Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d; 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (creating a 
wrongful discharge tort based on "beneficent purpose" of the workers5 
compensation law). 
Kansas Murphy v. City ofTopeka-Shawnee County Department of Labor 
Services et al, 6 Kan. App. 2d 488; 630 P.2d 186 (1981). 
Kentucky Firestone v. Tom Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (1983) superseded by statute 
KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 342.197 (prohibiting discharge, refusal to hire, 
harassment, coercion or discrimination in any manner) as recognized in 
Overnite Transportation Company v. Michael A. Gaddis, et al, 793 
S.W.2d 129 (1990). 
Michigan Svento v. The Kroger Company, 69 Mich. App. 644; 245 N.W.2d 151 
(1976) (retaliatory discharge contravenes public policy) This state now 
has a statute to enforce retaliatory discharge MICK COMP. LAWS § 418.301 
(prohibiting discharge or discrimination in any manner). 
Nebraska Jackson v. Morris Communications Corporation, 265 Neb. 423; 657 
N.W.2d 634 (2003). 
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Nevada Hansen v. Harrah 's, 100 Nev. 60; 675 P.2d 394 (1984). 
New Mexico Michaels v. Anglo America Auto Auctions, Inc., Ill N.M. 91; 869 P.2d 
279 (1994) (enforcing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28.2) (prohibiting 
discharge, threatening to discharge or retaliating). 
North Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home and Rodney Auer, 415 N. W.2d 
Dakota 793 (1987) (allowing a cause of action based on N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-
01-01, which provides a cause of action based on language in the 
workers5 compensation act providing for "sure and certain relief). 
Pennsylvania Shickv. Donald L. Shirey T/D/B/A Donald L. Shirey Lumber, 465 Pa. 
Super. 667; 691 A.2d511 (1997). 
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